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The rank-dependent utility (RDU) models of the evidence against subjective expected utility (SEU), which surely is overwhelming, tell us is wrong with 1980s (for a summary see Quiggin, 1993) have exactly the feature of maintaining preference rationality and that theory. I have argued (Luce, 1990 (Luce, , 1992 that it is very important to abandoning most of structural rationality. Their most complex structural property is what has been called distinguish between two types of rationality embodied in SEU. The one, called preference rationality, event commutativity: includes such principles as transitivity and consequence monotonicity (i.e., replacing a consequence in ((x, D; 0) , E; 0) Ç ((x, E; 0), D; 0).
(2) a gamble by something better can only make the gamble better). Violations of these properties typically Here the bottom line is reasonably clear: x if D and E both occur and 0 otherwise; they differ only in the are viewed as errors when they are pointed out to subjects. The other type, called structural rationality, order in which D and E are realized.
3 This has been tested and although the results are somewhat mixed, says that one's preferences should not be altered by changing the way a gamble is formulated so long as the most careful laboratory study (Chung, von Winterfeldt, & Luce, 1994) supports Eq. (2) for a large the bottom line remains unchanged.
1 It may well be that people agree to this in principle, but most un-proportion of subjects. Adding further, more complex conditions of structural rationality, such as Eq. (1), aided people simply fail to implement it successfully.
2 There is a current debate about consequence monotonicity with Lola Lopes has made useful comments on a draft of this commentary. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: R. Duncan Birnbaum (1992) and Mellers, Weiss, and Birnbaum (1992) claiming evidence against it and von Winterfeldt, Chung, Luce, and Cho (subLuce: Social Science Tower, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717. E-mail: rdluce@uci.edu. mitted) arguing that the apparent violations can be attributed to the noisiness of the data. 1 Economists often, seemingly unwittingly, invoke the fully strength of structural rationality by assuming that lotteries can be 3 Lopes has raised the question of what happens when on the first run the outcome 0 occurs: is the second run carried out anyway? modeled as random variables. The convention of probability theory is that two formulations of random variables that have the same
The theory is neutral on this point, but it might make an empirical difference. So far as I know, it has never been studied. distribution are to be treated as identical. to the rank-dependent model eliminates the rank de-disposition to accept gambles with negative EVs. We confronted them with 10 gambles whose EVs were pendence and so reduces it to SEU and that automatically forces a vast array of structural equivalences slightly negative-about 0$2-and we determined their CEs. A subject was classed as a ''gambler'' if 7 or (Luce & Narens, 1985) .
The Samuelson example in the Lopes article raises more 7 of the CEs were positive and as a ''nongambler'' otherwise. Our conclusion from the partitioned data another aspect of rationality not touched on at all by SEU or RDU. His argument is this: Suppose g is a was that the gamblers tended to violate Eq. (3) whereas nongamblers appeared to satisfy it. gamble with large gains and large losses but EV(g) ú 0. An ''irrational'' person prefers the status quo to havClosely related to this work, Luce and Fishburn (1991, 1995) argued that one really should enrich the ing g but, for some sufficiently large n, prefers playing it n times independently, 4 g n , to the status quo. A domain of certain consequences and gambles to include receiving several things-gambles or certain conserather more common example, exhibited by millions of people every day, is to prefer to the status quo a lottery quences-at once. Denote by gᮍh the joint receipt of the independent gambles g and h. As noted above, from for which, when the purchase price is taken into account, EV(g) õ 0. Yet, for most people, there is some a rational perspective-e.g., Samuelson's-joint receipt should just be convolution, i.e., ᮍ Å * . Cho and sufficiently large n-usually rather small-such that they will not buy n or more such lotteries, and so the found this equality not to be rejected for their gamblers, but it was for their non-gamblers. So status quo is preferred 5 to the convolution g n . Clearly, as Samuelson observes, such behavior is totally incon-both types of people appear to be nonrational, but in different ways: the gamblers see that ᮍ Å * , which is sistent with expected value calculations, but it is not clear one way or the other whether it is inconsistent rational, but fail to be monotonic, which is not; the nongamblers are monotonic in * , which is rational, but with RDU, SEU, or even EU. The difficulty is that the classical theories do not provide any formula for calcu-fail to see that ᮍ Å * , which is not.
To illustrate further the usefulness of the concept of lating U(g n ) from U(g). This aspect of rationality/nonrationality debate seems to have received less attention joint receipt consider the following properties. The first is the highly rational property of segregation, i.e., for than one might expect given its ubiquitousness.
Recently examined such issues theoreti-x and y of the same sign, cally and Cho and Luce (1995) studied them experimentally. Under fairly well confirmed assumptions, I (x, E; 0)ᮍy Ç (xᮍy, E; y). (4) showed that if CE denotes the certainty equivalent of a gamble, i.e., a sum of money for which CE(g) Ç g, The second is that the status quo is singular, i.e., then a person who is monotonic 6 in convolution * has to exhibit the property
And the third is binary rank dependence for the special gamble (g, E; 0), i.e., taking into account Eq. (5), and, conversely, Eq. (3) implies monotonicity of * . Obviously, a person for which CE(g) Å EV(g) satisfies Eq.
(3) because convolution is nothing but the distribution of the sum of independent random variables. Clearly, where W is a weight (between 0 and 1) assigned to the those buying lottery tickets must violate Eq. (3) for event E. In general, the weights are not probabilities. sufficiently many convolutions because were they mon-Furthermore, different weighting functions are used otonic we would have the contradiction CE(g) ú 0 and depending on whether g is seen as a net gain or a net CE(g n ) Å nCE(g) õ 0. loss. To study this issue empirically, Cho and Luce (1995) Luce and Fishburn (1991, 1995) showed, first, that first attempted to classify subjects according to their these three assumptions (plus some assumptions on the richness of the domain) imply that for gains, 8 there 4 Technically, lotteries are independent random variables, and the is a positive constant C such that distribution of their sum is the convolution of their distributions.
5 As Lopes has pointed out to me, this apparent reversal of prefer-7 The conclusion does not change if one uses 6 or more or 8 or more ence may, of course, be dictated by some, partially self-imposed, budget constraint. The actual underlying cause of the reversal is, how-in constructing the partition. 8 For losses, the same equation holds except that the constant (a ever, immaterial to my argument. 6 Monotonicity of * means that g Ռ g if and only if g * h Ռ g * h. different one) is negative.
so, it clearly is important to distinguish between ᮍ and
) * . Duplex decomposition coupled with the assumption that utility is additive over the joint receipt of gains and losses, i.e., If ᮍ is monotonic, which seems to be somewhat in doubt for gains from data of Cho and Luce (1995),
then U must be bounded by C. Second, using Eq. (7) recursively with the obvious generalization of segregafor which we lack a strong argument 10 results in tion to any finite gamble of gains (or of losses), they derived the general rank-dependent representation for
gains (and losses). There is empirical evidence both in Cho, Luce, and von Winterfeldt (1994) and in Cho and here different weights are used depending on the Luce (1995) favoring segregation. The separation propsign of the consequence. Because in general W / (E ) erty of Eq. (6) is common to many theories and was / W 0 (¬ E ) x 1, U(0) must be 0 and so U is a ratio, tested experimentally using additive conjoint measurenot an interval, scale measure of utility. Equation ment methods by Tversky (1967) . So Eq. (7) and the (11) is a feature of rank-and sign-dependent theory rank-dependent form appear to be a very plausible (Luce, 1991; Luce & Fishburn, 1991) , cumulative properties of utility. [Note that Eq. (7) differs greatly prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , and from the formula proposed by Thaler (1985) called the the earlier and much more restricted prospect theory hedonic rule, whose properties were worked out by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Fishburn and .]
I have gone through these details in an attempt to If xᮍy Å x / y, which many have conjectured and make clear that some descriptive theories have been has been sustained in the experiment of Cho and Luce derived by carefully blending rationality and nonratio-(1995) but violated for gains in a questionnaire study nality assumptions that appear to be sustained empiriby Thaler (1985) , then Eq. (7) implies that U has the cally. The resulting models violate, as do untutored following negative exponential dependence on money subjects, many-indeed, most-of the structural ratio- (Luce & Fishburn, 1995) : For x ú 0, there exists k ú nality equivalences. 0 such that Even so, as Lopes has emphasized, it is difficult to reconcile such theories with the reasonably clear evi-
dence that subjects' reference or aspiration levels have a significant impact on behavior. In the rank-and signAnother use of joint receipt arises with gambles of dependent theories, 0 (i.e., no exchange) plays that role: mixed gains and losses. Consider the following propgains and losses in money are handled differently acerty, called duplex decomposition: For x ú 0 ú 0y, cording to these theories. The problem is that we have a number of reasons, many due to Lopes, to believe (x, E; 0y) Ç (x, E; 0)ᮍ(0, EЉ; 0y), (9) that subjects do not always set their level at 0. In a choice between ($100, .5; $10) and ($50, .5; $25), a perwhere E and EЉ are realizations of the event E in two son selecting the former and receiving $10 is likely to independent runs of the underlying chance experiment. see that consequence as, in some sense, a loss because Duplex decomposition violates the rationality condition at least $25 was guaranteed by choosing the other gamthat ᮍ Å * because the convolution of the right two ble. We still lack a satisfactory theory of how reference gambles clearly is not identical to the left gamble. levels are established and, for that matter, good empiriNonetheless, a fair amount of data sustain Eq. (9) cal ways of estimating them directly. Cho and I have (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Payne & Braunstein, attempted to elicit reference levels directly with little 1971; Cho, Luce, & von Winterfeldt, 1995) . That being success. Luce, Mellers, and Chang (1993) suggested, none-too-seriously, one such theory which was based 9 They provide evidence that either ᮍ is not monotonic or CEs as on the following principle: for gains, the reference level they determined them using the up-down choice procedure called is the least CE of the gambles in the choice set and for PEST are not order preserving over ᮍ or both. Neither alternative warms a theorist's heart, and so it continues to be under investiga- 10 Luce and Fishburn (1991) argued for Eq. (10) on the grounds tion. An attempt is being made to collect sufficient data from each subject so that they can be studied individually. This is essential if that it is the simplest form that is compatible with Eq. (7) and that maintains the monotonicity of preference over ᮍ. This is not a very there are substantial individual differences which is suggested by the observed differences in the (perhaps gross) partitioning of sub-strong argument, especially if it turns out that preferences over ᮍ are not monotonic. jects into gamblers and nongamblers. Luce, R. D. (1991) . Rank-and sign-dependent linear utility models losses it is the least loss CE. We showed that recoding for binary gambles. Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 75-100. the gambles as gains and losses relative to such a refer- Luce, R. D. (1992) . Where does subjective-expected utility fail deence level could in fact account for many anomalous scriptively? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, phenomena. But we admitted this was a mere demon- . Joint receipt and certainty equivalents of gambles. stration of the flexibility of such models and did not Journal of Mathematical Psychology 39, [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] propose it as a serious theory. Until we understand Luce, R. D., & Fishburn, P. C. (1991) . Rank-and sign-dependent a lot better than we now do how reference levels get linear utility models for finite first-order gambles. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, established, it is doubtful if a good theory will appear. Luce, R. D., & Fishburn, P. C. (1995) . A note on deriving rankAlthough I get there by a somewhat different route, dependent utility using additive joint receipts. Journal of Risk and I concur with Lopes final conclusion: ''Although each Uncertainty 11, 5-16. paradox and axiom is attractive in its own way, none Luce, R. D., Mellers, B. A., & Chang, S-J. (1993) . Is choice the correct compels unthinking allegiance. Rather, each enriches primitive? On using certainty equivalents and reference levels to our understanding of the evolving and imperfect conpredict choices among gambles. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, structions that humankind has created to describe and 6, 115-143. to aid decision making.'' Luce, R. D., & Narens, L. (1985) . Classification of concatenation structures by scale type. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 29, 1-72.
